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Abstract: We give a procedure to obtain falsity conditions for IF-sentences,
using Skolemization. The expressive power of an IF-sentence can then be
strongly captured by a pair of Σ11-sentences. A result from [Burgess 2003]
shows that, conversely, any pair of incompatible Σ11-sentences corresponds with
an IF-sentence.
In the second part, we reflect on the influence of the order of the steps
(inside-out versus outside-in) in the Skolemization procedures for IF-logic. We
also reflect on the nature of game theoretical negation.
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1 Introduction
In his book The Principles of Mathematics Revisited ([Hintikka 1996]),
Jaakko Hintikka proposes Independence Friendly Logic (IF-logic) with
Game Theoretical Semantics as the logic that could open new directions
in the foundations of mathematics.
IF-logic uses the syntax of classical first order logic, with an addi-
tional slash operator. This operator removes the slashed quantification
or connective from the (syntactic) scope of the quantifications that ap-
pear under the slash. Semantically, the first becomes independent of the
latter. For example, in the IF-formula ∀x∃y/x[x = y], the value of y may
not depend on the value of x.
Game Theoretical Semantics (GTS) associates with every IF-sentence
ϕ and suitable model M a semantical game GM (ϕ), played by two play-
ers: Eloïse, who starts the game in the role of Verifier, and Abélard, who
starts in the role of Falsifier.
Moves in the game are choices for domain elements as assignments
for the variables bound by the quantifiers ∃ (move for player in the role
of Verifier) and ∀ (move for the player in the role of Falsifier) and choices
for ‘left’ or ‘right’, associated with the connectives ∨ and ∧ (move for
Verifier and Falsifier respectively). The negation sign ∼ makes the two
players change roles.
The structure of the game is fixed by the syntax of the formula with-
out the slashes: the slash operator induces restrictions on the level of
the strategies. A strategic choice associated with a slashed quantifier or
connective, cannot be based on the moves associated with the variables
under the slash. We could say that the choice is made by the player,
without knowing the values of the variables under the slash.
Truth and falsity of a sentence ϕ in a modelM are defined as follows:
M ||=t ϕ := ϕ is true in M
:= there exists a winning strategy for Eloïse in GM (ϕ)
M ||=f ϕ := ϕ is false in M
:= there exists a winning strategy for Abélard in GM (ϕ)
It is a well known fact that finite two-player win-loss games of perfect
information are determined, in the sense that one of the players has a
winning strategy. By this fact, GTS makes first order formulas always
either true or false.
For IF-formulas, this is no longer the case: the interpretation of
the slash operator in GTS turns the semantical games into games of
imperfect information. In that type of games, it can be the case that
none of the two players has a winning strategy in a game GM (ϕ). Hence:
for an IF-formula ϕ, M ||=t ϕ does not necessarily imply that M ||=f ϕ.
A strategy prescribes a choice for a player in every possible position
of the game in which it is that player’s turn. If we describe every such
choice by a function, a strategy consists of a sequence of functions. The
arguments of those functions reflect the available input information of
the choices. By this correspondence the existence of a winning strategy
can be expressed as a Σ11-sentence: a statement about the existence of
functions satisfying certain first order properties.
In the book [Hintikka 1996], the main focus is on the expressive power
of IF-logic by its truth conditions. By the view that the strategic choices
of Eloïse correspond to Skolem functions, the formulation of truth condi-
tions as Σ1
1
-sentences, is a matter of applying a generalized Skolemization
procedure.
First, we discuss some aspects of the focus on truth. Then we will
show how falsity conditions can be formulated as Σ11-sentences as well.
2 Focus on truth
In his book, as in his other work on the subject, Hintikka focuses
strongly on when IF-sentences are true. We give three points where this
focus is visible. We illustrate these points by a comparison of the simple
IF-formula ∀x∃y/x[x = y] with the first order formula ∃y∀x[x = y].
The first point (also pointed out in [Benthem 2000]) is the notion
of equivalence: formulas are equivalent if they are true in exactly the
same models. In other words: for all IF-sentences ϕ and ψ,
ϕ ≡t ψ
d
⇔ for all suitable models M :M ||=t ϕ iff M ||=t ψ.
Hintikka explicitly chooses to work with this version of equivalence:
Are two sentences logically equivalent if they are true in the
same models [. . . ] or are they to be called so if they are true
and false in the same models? In this work, I will consistently
opt for the former alternative[. . . ]. ([Hintikka 1996, 65])
We will call this notion of equivalence truth equivalence. Let us define
strong equivalence as follows:
ϕ ≡ ψ
d
⇔ ϕ ≡t ψ and ϕ ≡f ψ
where ≡f is the obvious counterpart of ≡t:
ϕ ≡f ψ
d
⇔ for all suitable models M :M ||=f ϕ iff M ||=f ψ.
That strong equivalence is indeed stronger than truth equivalence, can
already be recognized in simple formulas: the IF-formula ∀x∃y/x[x = y]
is true in one-element models only, and thereby truth equivalent to the
first order sentence ∃y∀x[x = y]. However, the first formula is never
false, whereas the second formula is false in all models with at least two
elements.
Another issue that makes the focus on truth evident, is related to the
issue of equivalence. Every IF-sentence is claimed to have an existential
second order-, in other words: Σ1
1
-translation. Conversely, every Σ1
1
-
sentence is said to be translatable into an IF-sentence. (See [Hintikka
1996, 61–63], items (F) and (G).) This back-and-forth translation is
crucial for the arguments backing the metalogical properties.
One should be aware, however, of the fact that the translation pro-
cedures are only truth-preserving, and disregard the falsity-aspects of
the IF-formulas involved. This is demonstrated by the application of the
back-and-forth translation to the first order formula ∃y∀x[x = y]:
IF Σ1
1
(1) ∃y∀x[x = y]
ց
(2) ∃f∀x[x = f ]
ւ
(3) ∀x∃y/x[x = y]
The formulas (1) and (3) share (2) as their truth condition, but where
the original formula is false in all models containing at least two elements,
the formula that arises after the back-and-forth translation is never false!
This example shows in particular that the back-and-forth translation is
not closed on the first order fragment of IF-logic, exactly by the fact
that falsity conditions are not preserved.
Finally, the focus on truth is also visible in the syntax: Hintikka
defines IF-logic from first order formulas in negation normal form, and
applies the slash operator only to existential quantifiers and disjunc-
tions. This means that the information restrictions only restrict Eloïse
in her choice of strategies, and therefore affect only the truth aspect of
a formula.
The formula ∃y∀x/y[x = y] –which is strongly equivalent to our IF-
example ∀x∃y/x[x = y]: both are true in one element models only, and
never false– is for example not an IF-formula in Hintikka’s definition of
the IF-syntax.
[Hintikka 1996] stresses the importance of the descriptive function of
logic: characterization of classes of models by logical formulae.
Given a formula, we can investigate the class of models in which
this formula is true by the given semantics. In the case of IF-logic, this
comes down to answering the question: given an IF-formula ϕ, in which
models M does Eloïse have a winning strategy for GM (ϕ)? But an IF-
formula not only determines the class of models that make it true, it
also determines the class of models that make the formula false. So, one
could ask the dual question: given an IF-formula ϕ, in which models
does Abélard have a winning strategy for GM (ϕ)?
If ϕ is a first order formula, we know that the class of models in which
Abélard has a winning strategy, is exactly the complement of the class
of models in which Eloïse has a winning strategy: first order semantical
games are determined. For IF-formulas however, the answer to our dual
question does not necessarily give us the answer to the first. In any case,
as IF-semantical games are in general not determined, the second class
is not simply the complement of the first.
We will study how to characterize the class of models in which an
IF-formula is false. But first we have to settle some technical issues in
order to be able to broaden the perspective of IF-logic from truth-only
to truth-and-falsity.
3 Technicalities
First, it should be remarked that we will take IF-logic to be closed
under (the game theoretical) negation, i.e. if ϕ is an IF-formula, then so
is ∼ϕ.
In his book, Hintikka is not explicit about this: he defines the syn-
tax from first order formulas already in negation normal form, with the
slash applied to existential quantification and disjunction only ([Hintikka
1996, 52]). This would mean that the moves of the player in the role
of Falsifier would always be of perfect information. Consider for exam-
ple the negated formula ∼∀x∃y/x[x = y], which can be seen never to
be true, and false in one-element models only. Then the weakly equiv-
alent (“truth-equivalent”) formula ∃x∀y[x = y] would be an IF-formula
(this formula is always false), and not the strongly equivalent formula
∃x∀y/x[x = y].
If one focuses on truth only, imperfect information for the Falsifier is
irrelevant. But as we want to include falsity aspects, we choose to allow
for the application of the slash to both ∃ and ∀, and to both ∨ and ∧.
This enables us to state the following:
Fact 3. 1 (De Morgan’s laws for IF-logic). If ϕ is an IF-sentence, write
ϕ[ψ] ≡ ϕ[ψ′] to express that if ψ occurs as a subformula of ϕ, then the
result of replacing ψ with ψ′ in ϕ, is (strongly) equivalent to ϕ. We can
then state De Morgan’s laws for IF-logic as follows:
ϕ[∼(∀x/yψ)] ≡ ϕ[∃x/y(∼ψ)] (2)
ϕ[∼(∃x/yψ)] ≡ ϕ[∀x/y(∼ψ)] (3)
ϕ[∼(ψ1 ∧/y ψ2)] ≡ ϕ[(∼ψ1) ∨/y (∼ψ2)] (4)
ϕ[∼(ψ1 ∨/y ψ2)] ≡ ϕ[(∼ψ1) ∧/y (∼ψ2)] (5)
In fact, these equivalences hold in the strongest sense possible. Not
just does there exist a winning strategy for the formula on the left side
iff there exists a winning strategy for the one on the right side (for a
given player, in a given model). More directly: a winning strategy for
the formula on the left side is a winning strategy for the right side and
vice versa. This is because the games for the formulas on the left side,
are exactly the same games as those for the formulas on the right side.
Informally: the exchange of roles combined with the flipping of the
quantifier (or connective) cancels out. This can easily be seen if we code
semantical games as games in extensive form. (See for example [Osborne
& Rubinstein 1994] for a general description of games in extensive form,
and [Sandu & Pietarinen 2003], [Sandu & Pietarinen 2001] or [Dechesne
2005] for the formalisation of semantical games in these terms.)
Corollary 3.1. For every IF-formula ϕ there exists a strongly equiva-
lent IF-formula in negation normal form (NNF), i.e. with negation signs
occurring before atomic formulas only.
When formulating the conditions under which a player has a winning
strategy, we assume that no information is available on which strategy
the opponent has chosen to play. In a realistic situation, one could imag-
ine that some strategies of the opponent can be marked as more or less
probable (particularly when the game is played repeatedly). But seman-
tical games are abstract games in which no probability, only certainty
counts.
We could say that the two players choose their own strategies simul-
taneously, independently of the other player.
From this follows:
Lemma 3.2. An IF-sentence ϕ in NNF is truth-equivalent with the
IF-formula ϕ′ resulting from ϕ after removing the slashes at universal
quantifiers and conjunctions.
E.g.:
∀x∃y/x∀z/yψ ≡t ∀x∃y/x∀zψ.
This lemma enables us to use Hintikka’s Skolemization procedure for
finding truth conditions. We needed the slashes at universal quantifiers
and conjunctions in the process of writing an IF-formula in a (strongly)
equivalent negation normal form. But after this process, we can ignore
them again when looking for a truth condition. This way, we avoid ob-
taining an existential second order truth condition with slashed universal
quantifiers and connectives (which would not be a Σ11-formula because
of these slashes).
The dual of the lemma is of course also true, but we will not need
it: ϕ is falsity-equivalent to the IF-formula ϕ′′ resulting from ϕ after
removing the slashes for existential quantifiers; e.g.
∀x∃y/x∀z/yψ ≡f ∀x∃y∀z/yψ.
4 Winning conditions for both players
[Hintikka 1996, 61] gives an extended Skolemization-procedure to
transform an IF-first order sentence ϕ (in NNF) into a Σ1
1
-sentence Φ of
the form:
∃f1 . . .∃fk∀x1 . . .∀xlξ,
where ξ is a quantifier-free (and slash-free) formula.
By the correspondence between the notion of strategy that emerges
from Hintikka’s GTS, and the notion of Skolem function, this second
order sentence Φ serves as the truth condition for ϕ: for every model M
suitable for the language of ϕ
M ||=t ϕ iff M |=sol Φ,
where we use ‘|=sol’ for satisfaction in semantics for second order logic.
Hintikka seems to have intended full semantics for second order logic
([Hintikka 1996, 214, second paragraph]). 1
We note here that, even though the choice of semantics determines
the evaluation of the truth- and falsity conditions, and crucially, the met-
alogical properties of IF-logic, it does not play a role in the construction
of the truth (and falsity) conditions. However, the result we prove in sec-
tion 6.1 does depend on the choice of full semantics for second order logic.
The following simple observation shows how truth- and falsity con-
ditions are two sides of the same coin:
Lemma 4.1. A falsity condition for an IF-sentence ϕ is a truth condi-
tion of ∼φ:
M ||=f ϕ iff M ||=t∼ϕ.
This follows easily from the interpretation of negation as role exchange
in GTS.
Corollary 4.2. We can express the truth and falsity conditions of an
IF-formula ϕ by two Σ11-sentences, Φt and Φf .
To obtain Φf, we first construct an IF-formula that is equivalent to ∼ϕ
(by Corollary 3.1), then drop occurring slashes for universal quantifiers
(by Lemma 3.2) and finally apply the Skolemization procedure (as de-
scribed by Hintikka).
As an example, we formulate the truth- and falsity conditions of
a formula ϕ that is true exactly in all infinite models (that such for-
mulas exist, is well-known and follows easily from the fact that every
Σ1
1
-sentence is truth condition of an IF-formula).
Infinity is a typical example of a Σ11-definable property of models
(as a consequence of the compactness of first order logic, it is not first
order definable). The truth condition Φt expresses Dedekind-infinity:
the existence of of an injective, non-surjective function on the model of
1. We refer to [Väänänen 2001] for an overview of the consequences of the choice
of semantics for the metalogical properties of second order logic.
the domain. Note that in Φt, f2 are f3 forced to be interpreted by the
same function, by the left-right part of the double arrow, that is injective
by the right-left part, and non-surjective by the right conjunct (f1 is a
0-ary function symbol, and is used as a Skolem constant). 2
ϕ := ∃z∀x∀y∃u/y∃v/x[(x = y ↔ u = v) ∧ u = z]
Φt : ∃f1∃f2∃f3∀x∀y[(x = y ↔ f2(x) = f3(y)) ∧ f2(x) = f1]
∼ϕ ≡ ∀z∃x∃y∀u/y∀v/x[∼(x = y ↔ u = v) ∨ u = z]
Φf : ∃f1∃f2∀z∀u∀v[¬(f1(z) = f2(z)↔ u = v) ∨ u = z]
We can now conclude that ϕ is false in M precisely if M is a 1-element
model, because only in that case: M |= Φf).
We warn the reader that any IF-sentence that is true in precisely
the class of infinite models, must be undetermined in some finite mod-
els. If an IF-sentence would be false in (precisely) all finite models, its
falsity condition would be a Σ11-sentence expressing finiteness. This is
impossible because Σ1
1
is compact.
This shows how we should be careful with the notions like finiteness
and infinity (the one is the contradictory negation of the other), in com-
bination with the game theoretical negation and the associated notions
of truth and falsity. Because we don’t have a contradictory negation in
IF-logic, expressibility of infinity does not imply expressibility of finite-
ness.
5 IF-sentences correspond with Σ11-pairs
With the procedure described above, we have a mechanism to asso-
ciate with every IF-sentence ϕ, a pair (Φt,Φf) of Σ
1
1
-sentences, such that
for every suitable model M :
M ||=t ϕ⇔M |=sol Φt
and
M ||=f ϕ⇔M |=sol Φf.
The pair (Φt,Φf) divides the class of all suitable models for the language
of ϕ into three disjoint subclasses: the class Mϕt of models satisfying
2. Although the definition of implication for arbitrary IF-formulas is problematic
[Hintikka 1996, 138], on the atomic level we can read implication signs as classical
material implication. We use the double implication in ϕ just for notational efficiency:
‘(x = y ↔ u = v)’ should be read as ‘(x = y ∧ u = v) ∨ (x 
= y ∧ u 
= v)’.
Φt, the class M
ϕ
f
of models satisfying Φf, and finally the class Mϕu of
models satisfying neither. We remark that the class Mϕ
u
is not Σ1
1
- but
Π11-definable. If it is empty, then M
ϕ
t is the complement of M
ϕ
f
, hence
both classes are both Σ1
1
and Π1
1
, and thus first order definable. This
can only be the case if ϕ is (strongly equivalent to) a first order formula.
For a Σ1
1
-sentence Φ, letMΦ
sol
denote the class of suitable models M
in which Φ is satisfied (M |=sol Φ).
We can now say that, if ϕ is an IF-sentence and Φ a Σ11-sentence,
then Φ is a truth condition for ϕ ifMϕt =M
Φ
sol
. Also, Φ is a falsity
condition for ϕ if Mϕ
f
=MΦ
sol
.
On a sentential (propositional) level, we can formulate a nice cor-
respondence between the propositional connectives ∧,∨,∼, and the fol-
lowing operations on pairs of Σ11-sentences:
IF-sentence Σ1
1
× Σ1
1
ϕ (Φt,Φf)
ψ (Ψt,Ψf)
∼ϕ (Φf,Φt)
ϕ ∧ ψ (Φt ∧Ψt,Φf ∨Ψf)
ϕ ∨ ψ (Φt ∨Ψt,Φf ∧Ψf)
∼ϕ ∨ ψ (Φf ∨Ψt,Φt ∧Ψf)
The last line of the table gives some insight in the problems we have
defining implication for IF-logic. It shows that a definition of implica-
tion in terms of game theoretical negation and the disjunction would be
stronger than intended. Intuitively, one expects an implication ϕ⇒G ψ
in GTS to express “if Eloïse has a winning strategy in GM (ϕ), then
she has one in GM (ψ)”. This is a (material) implication on the level of
strategies, and would correspond to the truth condition: ¬Φt∨Ψt. This
condition is weaker than the condition Φf ∨Ψt, because M
ϕ
f
⊆ (Mϕt )
c,
which for IF-formulas in general is a proper inclusion. More importantly,
¬Φt ∨Ψt is in general not Σ11, while truth conditions of IF-formulas are
always Σ11.
As suggested by [Hintikka 1996, 161, item (k)], this problem is solved
in so called Extended IF-logic, in which contradictory negation is added
as a truth functional operator. Propositional logic with strong and weak
negation is one of the topics studied in [Sandu & Pietarinen 2001].
If we would like to exceed the propositional level, and formulate the
truth- and falsity conditions for IF-formulas rather than sentences, the
treatment of the slashed quantifiers turns out to be a difficult hurdle as of
their context dependency. Semantics for IF-formulas with free variables
are given in e.g. [Hodges 1997], [Caicedo & Krynicki 1999].
6 Σ11-pairs corresponding with IF-sentences
In [Caicedo & Krynicki 1999], the following question is posed:
Is it true that for each pair of disjoint Σ1
1
-classes K1,K2 of
structures of the same type there is an IF-sentence ϕ such
thatK1 =M
ϕ
t andK2 =M
ϕ
f
? In such case part (b) [of The-
orem 5.1 in their paper] would give a quick proof of Craig’s
interpolation theorem. ([Caicedo & Krynicki 1999, 30], trans-
lated into our notation)
In a recent note of J. Burgess on this question in a logic with Henkin
quantifiers ( [Burgess 2003]), the issue is attacked in the reverse direc-
tion. Using Interpolation 3 for Σ1
1
, Burgess proves that for any pair of
incompatible Henkin sentences (Φ0,Φ1), there is a Henkin sentence Θ
such that Θ is (truth-)equivalent with Φ0 and ∼Θ is (truth-)equivalent
with Φ1.
4 In order to prove this, the class of models is restricted:
To avoid trivialities, in the logic of first-order sentences it
is conventional to exclude models with an empty domain,
while in the logic of Henkin sentences it will be convenient to
exclude models with a one-element domain as well. ([Burgess
2003])
On a closer look, this restriction can be seen to be quite natural for
IF-languages: in models with only one element, the slash in IF-formulas
is meaningless. We also note that the existence of at least two distinct
elements in the models is already implicitly assumed by Hintikka, e.g. in
his procedure to eliminate slashed connectives [Hintikka 1996, 52].
Note that under this restriction, the formula θ0 := ∀x∃y/x[x = y] is
never (i.e. in no model) true, nor false. We choose not to introduce a
new notation for our classes of models to make the restriction, in the
rest of this paper, to "≥ 2-models" explicit. So: Mθ0t =M
θ0
f
= ∅.
3. More specifically: the fact that for any incompatible pair of Σ1
1
-formulas Φ,Ψ
(i.e. MΦ
sol
∩MΨ
sol
= ∅), there is a first order sentence θ such that MΦ
sol
⊆Mθ
sol
and
MΨ
sol
⊆ (Mθ
sol
)c.
4. Here we use the symbol ∼ for what Burgess calls contrary negation of a Henkin
formula, which is obtained by flipping all quantifiers in the prefix and negating the
matrix, thus corresponding to our game theoretical negation. In his note, Burgess
uses the symbol ¬ for this contrary negation and ∼ for contradictory negation. To
stay consistent with Hintikka’s work, we use the symbols the other way around.
We can easily translate the result for Henkin sentences into the fol-
lowing theorem about pairs of Σ1
1
-sentences and IF-logic:
Theorem 6.1. Let Φ and Ψ be incompatible Σ11-sentences. Then there
is an IF-sentence θ such that Φ is a truth condition for θ, and Ψ is a
falsity condition for θ.
Proof: We use the IF-sentence θ0 := ∀x∃y/x[x = y].
To start the proof, consider the special case whereMΨ
sol
= ∅ (Ψ is an
inconsistent Σ1
1
-formula). Applying the translation procedure from Σ1
1
to IF-logic ([Hintikka 1996, 61–63]) to Φ, we find an IF-formula ϕ such
that Mϕt =M
Φ
sol
. Now take for θ := ϕ ∨ θ0. This gives us:
Mθ
t
=Mϕ∨θ0t =M
ϕ
t ∪M
θ0
t
=Mϕt ∪ ∅ =M
ϕ
t =M
Φ
sol
Mθ
f
=Mϕ∨θ0
f
=Mϕ
f
∩Mθ0
f
=Mϕ
f
∩ ∅ = ∅ =MΨ
sol
Now consider the general case. Using the translation procedure of
Hintikka, we find IF-sentences ϕ′, ψ′ such thatMϕ
′
t =M
Φ
sol
andMψ
′
t =
MΨ
sol
. We now form ϕ := ϕ′ ∨ θ0 and ψ := ψ′ ∨ θ0, in order to get
Mϕt =M
Φ
sol
, Mψt =M
Ψ
sol
, and Mϕ
f
=Mψ
f
= ∅.
By Craig’s theorem for Σ1
1
, because Φ and Ψ are incompatible, there
is a first order sentence χ such that Mϕt = M
Φ
sol
⊆ Mχt and M
ψ
t =
MΨ
sol
⊆ (Mχt )
c =Mχ
f
(χ is first order).
Now take θ := ϕ ∧ (∼ ψ ∨ χ), and we will have the following, to
complete the proof:
Mθ
t
=Mϕt ∩ (M
∼ψ
t ∪M
χ
t ) =M
ϕ
t ∩ (M
ψ
f
∪Mχt ) =M
ϕ
t ∩M
χ
t =M
Φ
sol
Mθ
f
=Mϕ
f
∪ (M∼ψ
f
∩Mχ
f
) =Mψt ∩M
χ
f
=MΨ
sol
We can conclude that the (strong) expressive power of IF-sentences
consists of all pairs of incompatible Σ11-sentences.
As Burgess stresses in [Burgess 2003], contrary negation on Henkin
sentences (for which we can read game theoretical negation on IF-sentences)
“does not correspond to the semantic operation of complementation on
classes of models, but further it does not correspond to any semantic
operation at all.”
The theorem above shows that there can be many different IF-formulas
that are truth equivalent, but pairwise not strongly equivalent. In fact,
there are as many of these formulas as there are Σ11-definable classes of
models disjoint with the (one) class of models in which they are all true.
To illustrate this, for every n ∈ N, let ψn be a first order formula
expressing that the domain contains at least n elements (for example,
we can take ψ3 = ∃x1∃x2∃x3[x1 = x2 ∧ x2 = x3 ∧ x3 = x1]), and let ϕ
be an IF-formula that is true in infinite models only (e.g. the formula
ϕ on page 309 of this paper). Define ϕn := ϕ ∧ ψn. Then for every n,
Mϕnt = M
ϕ
t (i.e. the class of all infinite models), while for all m with
n < m :Mϕn
f
Mϕm
f
(i.e. the classes of models with less than n and m
elements respectively).
7 Reflections on strategies and
Skolemization
The particular outcome of a run of a game GM (ϕ) is not what is rele-
vant for GTS. We are not even interested in particular winning strategies;
we are only interested to know whether one of the players has a winning
strategy, and if so, which player.
We could say that, by formulating truth- and falsity conditions as
above, we have given a ‘strategic’ form of semantical games: Eloïse can
force a win in GM (ϕ) if she can give an interpretation for the Skolem
functions such that M extended with these interpretations satisfies the
first order part of the Σ11-sentence Φt; and similarly for Abélard and Φf.
A game of perfect information in which the moves do not consist
of giving interpretations for variables, but of giving interpretations for
Skolem functions (only by Eloïse) is proposed in [Väänänen 2002].
Underlying the construction of our truth and falsity conditions, is
the view that Skolemization is the natural formalization of strategies
in semantical games. We did not go into the details of this procedure,
but there is one aspect we would like to discuss here: the order in which
the Skolemization steps are applied.
Skolemization consists of a step-by-step replacement of existentially
quantified variables by terms of the form f(x1, . . . , xn), where f is a
new function symbol, and x1, . . . , xn the variables in the scope of whose
quantification the existential quantification occurs; see e.g. [Fitting 1996,
section 7.11] 5.
For first order logic, Skolemiziation is usually applied ‘outside-in’,
meaning that we start by replacing the outermost existential quantifica-
tion. As a result, the arguments of the Skolem-functions are only univer-
sally quantified variables. For example, ∀x∃z∃y[R(x, y, z)] becomes (∃g)
∀x∃y[R(x, y, g(x))], which then becomes (∃f∃g) ∀x[R(x, f(x), g(x))]. If
we would have applied the procedure ‘inside-out’, we would have got:
∀x∃z∃y[R(x, y, z)] becomes (∃f) ∀x∃z[R(x, f(x, z), z)], which then be-
comes (∃g∃f) ∀x[R(x, f(x, g(x)), g(x))]. The latter formula is of course
equivalent to (∃g∃h) ∀x[R(x, h(x), g(x))], hence in this case, the order
of the Skolemization procedure does not make a difference. In general:
for first order formulas, the order of the Skolemization doesn’t matter.
However, the IF-formula ∀x∃z∃y/x[x = y] (proposed in [Hodges 1997,
example 5.2]) shows us that in IF-logic the order of the (generalized)
Skolemization procedure is relevant. As result of the outside-in proce-
dure it gives ∃f∃g∀x[x = f ] (where f is a Skolem constant), while the
inside-out procedure first gives ∃f∀x∃z[x = f(z))], and then ∃g∃f∀x[x =
f(g(x))]. Game theoretically, Skolemizing outside-in allows only previ-
ous moves of the opponent as arguments of the strategy functions, while
Skolemizing inside-out allows all previous moves.
Hintikka confirms his choice for the (classically more usual) outside-
in procedure, by assuming the provision “that moves connected with
existential quantifiers are always independent of earlier moves with ex-
istential quantifiers” ([Hintikka 1996, 63]). This results in the game-
theoretically counterintuitive assumption that each player has forgotten
his/her own previous moves. 6
In [Hodges 1997] and [Caicedo & Krynicki 1999], we find semantics
for (more general) IF-languages, without this provision. The strategy
functions in these semantics can be seen to correspond with inside-out
Skolemization, as they use all previously quantified variables as argu-
ments for the functions.
On formulas such as Hodges’s formula above, these semantics there-
fore differ from Hintikka’s semantics with the provision. Also, semantics
5. For (slashed) disjunctions in IF-formulas, a similar replacement is part of Hin-
tikka’s generalized Skolemization procedure. We do not discuss this part of the pro-
cedure separately, also because it implies that disjunctions may be replaced by exis-
tential quantifications.
6. Or, alternatively, that we should see each player rather as a team, where each
member of the team knows some previous moves of the other team, but none of the
moves of his own team.
corresponding to inside-out Skolemization give us the means to charac-
terize infinity of the domain of a model in a more compact way: the
formula
∃u∀x∃y∃z/x[x = z ∧ y = u]
then gets the truth condition (with k a Skolem constant):
∃k∃g∃f∀x[x = f(k, g(k, x)) ∧ g(k, x) = k]
expressing that there is a function gk = g(k, . . . ) that is injective (be-
cause it has a left-inverse fk = f(k, . . . )), and non-surjective (because
k is outside the range of gk). This example ([Caicedo & Krynicki 1999,
example 1.4]) contains less quantifiers and connectives then the formula
ϕ given on page 309 of this paper.
Dropping the provision (or equivalently, switching from outside-in to
inside-out Skolemization) still delivers Σ1
1
-truth conditions. The expres-
sive power of IF-logic as a whole therefore does not depend on the order
chosen (see also [Caicedo & Krynicki 1999, theorems 4.2 and 4.3]).
8 Reflections on game theoretical negation
In this paper we have focused on falsity aspects of IF-formulas, a topic
closely related to the subject of game theoretical negation (as witnessed
by lemma 4.1).
The definition of game theoretical negation as role exchange, makes
the formula ϕ∨ ∼ϕ a statement expressing the determinacy of the games
GM (ϕ). We know that games for IF-sentences ϕ are in general not
determined, so ϕ∨ ∼ϕ, the ‘law’ of the excluded middle, is not a logical
law for IF-logic.
This reminds us of course of negation in intuitionistic logic, which is
also too strong to make the law of the excluded middle hold. We would
like to point out that this eye-catching shared property does not auto-
matically make IF-logic and intuitionistic logic related.
First, as easily as we see a shared property of the negations in the
two logics, we can also find a singificant difference. In intuitionistic
logic, the law of the excluded middle can be seen to be equivalent to
the cancellation of double negation (¬¬A → A), and conversely. In IF-
logic however, ∼∼ϕ is clearly equivalent to ϕ, by the fact that a double
role exchange (“turning the game board around twice in a row”) has no
significant effect to the semantical game.
Another important difference is that at the atomic level, game theo-
retical negation is equal to classical negation: the winner of the game is
determined by a purely classical evaluation of the atomic formula in the
given model. This gives every run of a game a winner. In intuitionistic
logic, it is possible that we do not have a proof nor a refutation for an
atomic proposition: atomic formulas may be undetermined.
Furthermore, game theoretical negation can be seen to coincide with
classical negation not only at the atomic level, but on all unslashed
formulas: i.e. for all classical first order sentences ϕ:
M |= ϕ
AC
⇄ M ||=t ϕ, and:
M |= ¬ϕ
AC
⇄ M ||=t∼ϕ
This follows from the axiom of choice, because this makes first order for-
mulas (interpreted classically) equivalent to their Skolemizations, i.e. the
truth conditions of these formulas in GTS. In the game theoretical def-
inition of truth, the axiom of choice is incorporated ([Hintikka 1996, 40]).
We see game theoretical negation and its behavior in GTS for IF-
logic, as an extension of classical negation rather than related to intu-
itionistic negation. The truth value gap introduced by the extension of
the game theoretic negation beyond first order logic is in some sense
unavoidable: truth and falsity conditions are incompatible and both Σ1
1
,
while Σ11 is not closed under classical negation (in other words: the collec-
tion of Σ1
1
-definable classes of models is not closed under complements).
However, if we would like to regard game theoretical negation as an ex-
tension of the operation that classical negation defines on the first order
definable classes of models to the Σ1
1
-definable classes, we have to realize
that the game theoretical negation does not correspond to any operation
at al, as shown by the result of Burgess (Theorem 6.1).
9 Conclusions
We showed how a falsity condition for an IF-formula ϕ, can be ob-
tained as a truth condition for ∼ϕ. We characterize an IF-formula not
only by its truth (as is usually the case in Hintikka’s work), but by both
truth and falsity, hence by a pair of Σ1
1
-sentences. A result of Burgess
shows that this gives us a correspondence between IF-sentences and in-
compatible pairs of Σ1
1
-sentences.
The procedures to obtain truth and falsity conditions, rely on a
Skolemization procedure. We explained that the order of the Skolemiza-
tion steps does make a difference in IF-logic, unlike in first order logic: it
reflects whether or not a player is assumed to forget his/her own previ-
ous moves. This difference does however not alter the expressive power
of IF-logic as a whole.
The result of Burgess demonstrates the curious fact that game the-
oretical negation does not correspond with any operation on classes of
models. Furthermore, we argued that game theoretical negation should
not be associated with intuitionistic negation to easily, just because both
make the ‘law’ of the excluded middle fail. IF-logic with GTS incor-
porates some unconstructive elements that make the game theoretical
negation more classical than intuitionistic.
For future research, it would be interesting to study the effect of
interpreting truth and falsity conditions constructively rather than clas-
sically. This would not only mean that we restrict the existential second
order quantifications to range, for example, over recursive functions, as
suggested in [Hintikka 1996, chapter 10], but we would also have to in-
terpret the connectives and predicates in a constructive way.
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